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State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #5867 
 
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #9525 
P.O. Box 2816 
Boise, ID 83701  
(208) 334-2712 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,    ) 
      ) 
 Plaintiff-Respondent,  ) NO. 43467 
      ) 
v.      ) TWIN FALLS COUNTY  
) NO. CR 2015-3261 
PAUL POVALAWSKI,   )  
      ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF 
 Defendant-Appellant.  ) 
________________________________ ) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Paul Povalawski was sentenced to a unified term of ten years, with two years 
fixed, after he pled guilty to driving while under the influence of alcohol (DUI), having a 
prior felony DUI conviction within fifteen years.  He contends the district court abused its 
discretion when it imposed this sentence and when it denied his motion pursuant to 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) for a reduction of sentence.  
  
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 On April 5, 2015, Mr. Povalawski lost control of the vehicle he was driving and 
drove into a ditch.  He was arrested for DUI and transported to the jail, where his breath 
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alcohol content was measured at .207 and .205.  (R., pp.11-12, 15.)  Mr. Povalawski 
was charged by Information with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol, having one prior felony DUI conviction within fifteen years.  (R., pp.74-76.)  
Mr. Povalawski pled guilty (without the benefit of a plea agreement) and was sentenced 
to a unified term of ten years, with two years fixed.  (5/26/15 Tr., p.3, Ls.11-16, p.7, 
Ls.7-14; R., p.100.)  The judgment was entered on July 6, 2015.  (R., pp.98-103.)   
Mr. Povalawski filed a Rule 35 motion on July 27, 2015.  (R., pp.106-07.)  He 
requested the district court reduce his sentence to ten years, with one year fixed, and 
pointed out that he had successfully completed probation without a single violation in 
the past, and would not present a safety concern on probation.  (R., p.107.)  The district 
court denied Mr. Povalawski’s motion, concluding it was untimely.  (R., p.124.)  
Mr. Povalawski filed a motion to reconsider and/or clarify, asking the district court to 
reconsider its ruling because the motion “was filed in a timely manner under Rule 35.”  
(R., pp.126-28.)  On August 2, 2015, the district court issued an order denying 
Mr. Povalawski’s Rule 35 motion.  (R., p.129.)  The court stated it had erroneously 
concluded the motion was untimely but, upon reconsideration, nonetheless exercised its 
discretion to deny the motion.  (R., pp.129-30.)   Mr. Povalawski filed a timely notice of 
appeal on August 6, 2015.  (R., pp.131-35.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed upon Mr. Povalawski, a 
unified sentence of ten years, with two years fixed, in light of the mitigating 
factors that exist in this case? 
 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Povalawski’s Rule 35 
motion? 
 
 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Upon Mr. Povalawski A 
Unified Sentence Of Ten Years, With Two Years Fixed, In Light Of The Mitigating 
Factors That Exist In This Case 
 
Mr. Povalawski asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of 
ten years, with two years fixed, is excessive.  Where, as here, the sentence imposed by 
the district court is within statutory limits, “the appellant bears the burden of 
demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.”  State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834 
(2011) (quoting State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875 (2011)).  “When a trial court 
exercises its discretion in sentencing, ‘the most fundamental requirement is 
reasonableness.’”  Id. (quoting State v. Hooper, 119 Idaho 606, 608 (1991)).  “A 
sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of 
protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, 
rehabilitation or retribution.”  Id. (citation omitted).  “When reviewing the reasonableness 
of a sentence this Court will make an independent examination of the record, ‘having 
regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of 
the public interest.’”  Id. (quoting State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982)). 
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 The sentence imposed upon Mr. Povalawski is not reasonable considering the 
nature of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public 
interest.  Looking first at the nature of the offense, Mr. Povalawski was driving while 
under the influence of alcohol, but was not driving with anyone else in his vehicle, and 
caused damage only to his vehicle—he did not injure himself or anyone else.  Driving 
while under the influence of alcohol is always a potentially dangerous crime, but, in this 
case, Mr. Povalawski harmed only himself.  His conduct does not warrant a unified 
sentence of ten years, with two years fixed. 
 The next factor for this Court to independently examine is the character of the 
offender.  The record reflects that Mr. Povalawski is a hardworking, earnest individual 
struggling with addiction.  Mr. Povalawski admitted at sentencing that he “made a 
mistake” but he had been doing well—very well—for four years.  (7/6/15 Tr., p.10, 
Ls.22-23.)  Mr. Povalawski successfully completed a CAPP rider in 2011, and was 
placed on probation for a period of four years beginning on January 24, 2011.  (Conf. 
Exs., p.7.)  He was discharged from probation without any violations on January 23, 
2014.  (Conf. Exs., p.7.)  To everyone’s regret, Mr. Povalawski relapsed in February 
2015, and he was arrested for the instant offense just two months later.  (Conf. Exs., 
p.13.)  The district court focused on the fact of Mr. Povalawski’s relapse, but the fact 
that Mr. Povalawski was sober for four years is far more telling.  At sentencing, 
Mr. Povalawski told the district court, “I just don’t want to go away and lose my job.”  
(7/6/15 Tr., p.11.)  Mr. Povalawski was—and is—motivated to remain sober and the 
sentence imposed by the district court is not reasonable.     
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 The final factor for this Court to consider is the protection of the public interest.  
There is every indication that the public could have been protected here if 
Mr. Povalawski was given a lesser sentence of incarceration or placed on probation.  
Mr. Povalawski was determined to present a moderate risk to re-offend and, at 
sentencing, his attorney recommended that Mr. Povalawski serve time in county jail or 
be placed in a retained jurisdiction program.  (Conf. Exs., p.16; 7/6/15 Tr., p.10, Ls.13-
16.)  The presentence investigator likewise recommended a retained jurisdiction 
program and the GAIN evaluator recommended intensive outpatient treatment.  (Conf. 
Exs., pp.16, 17, 35.)  Mr. Povalawski underwent a DUI evaluation prior to sentencing 
and that evaluation is probably the most important.  (Conf. Exs., pp.42-54.)  The DUI 
evaluator recommended outpatient treatment and programming:    
Due to the number of DUI’s and his drinking after attending the CAPP 
program and aftercare I recommend he attend a MADD victims’s [sic] 
panel to address what could have happened while driving under the 
influence, an Intensive Outpatient program to address his not being able 
to remain abstinent and an MRT class to address his continuing 
maladaptive thinking. 
 
(Conf. Exs., .p.46.)  Looking at all of the factors together, the sentence the district court 
imposed upon Mr. Povalawski was not reasonable. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Povalawski’s  
Rule 35 Motion 
 
Mr. Povalawski asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied 
his Rule 35 motion.  “A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is 
addressed to the sound discretion of the sentencing court and essentially is a plea for 
leniency which may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe.”  
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State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted).  “The denial of a 
motion for modification of a sentence will not be disturbed absent a showing that the 
court abused its discretion.”  Id.  “If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced, 
the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional 
information presented with the motion for reduction.”  Id.; see also State v. Huffman, 
144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). 
 In support of his Rule 35 motion, Mr. Povalawski submitted to the district court 
printouts from his prior cases from the iCourt Portal.  (R., p.108-18.)  These printouts 
reflect that Mr. Povalawski was successful on probation in the past and would not 
present a safety concern if placed on probation again.  (R., p.107.)  The district court 
denied the motion without any discussion—stating only that “although the motion was 
timely, it is still denied within the Court’s discretion.”  (R., p.129.)  This represents an 
abuse of discretion as it is clear that the sentence the district court imposed on 
Mr. Povlwski should have been reduced. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Mr. Povalawski respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it 
deems appropriate. 
 DATED this 29th day of February, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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